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Separation Anxiety: Free Exercise Versus Equal
Protection
BENSON A. WOLMAN*
Among the most fascinating and difficult constitutional questions are those which
involve conflicts of values underlying the religion clauses of the first amendment1 and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 At this writing one such
case, pending before the Supreme Court, can have no really satisfactory resolution for
those concerned about constitutional liberties, including this writer.
What follows is a view of the controversy surrounding the Dayton Christian
Schools3 case, focusing primarily upon some of the aspects of the free exercise of
religion issue 4 as it collides with the fourteenth amendment values in Ohio's laws that
prohibit discrimination in employment. This Article will examine those sections of
Ohio's antidiscrimination laws that appear to permit no exception for religious or
other forms of discrimination in religious institutions. The Article will consider
whether there must be exceptions and, if so, on what bases should they be created.
Profound questions are raised by Dayton Christian Schools. First, it must be
determined whether, or under what conditions, a state may prohibit a nonpublic
elementary and secondary school which maintains a pervasively religious atmosphere
for the inculcation of its students from applying a religious test for its teaching staff.
Second, if a religious test is constitutionally protected, then it must be determined
whether the test may (1) discriminate on the basis of gender and (2) include within
it a proscription on recourse to governmental authority.
The problem of discrimination based on truly held religious views may not
trouble those who make no distinction between various categories of non-rational
discrimination. But, for those for whom the concept of separation of church and state
on the one hand and a national commitment to equal protection of the laws on the
other both play a significant role in their scheme of things, the resolution of these
issues creates a real "separation anxiety."
In attempting to deal with the dilemma, Part I will give a background of the
controversy and a view of the pervasively sectarian nature of the school. Part II will
consider the special problem of the chain of command religious doctrine and its
* Benson A. Wolman is the Legislative Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio. The views
expressed are personal, not organizational, nor those to whom the author expresses his appreciation for assistance:
Professors Bernard Dushman (Assistant Dean, Yale Law School); Brian Freeman (Capital University College of Law);
David Goldberger, Lawrence Herman, and Louis Jacobs (all of The Ohio State University College of Law); and Richard
Saphire (University of Dayton College of Law); Jerilyn L. Wolman, Ph.D.; Susan Gellman, J.D.; Howard R. Besser,
Esq.; and Bruce A. Campbell, Esq.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ...." U.S. Com.,m. amend. I.
2. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Cos'r.
amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Ohio Civil Rights Comrn'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), appeal granted, 106
S. Ct. 2718 (1986). As this symposium went to press, the case was decided by the Supreme Court. See infra note 127.
4. While establishment clause issues also formed a basis for the decisions of the district and circuit courts in this
case, they are used herein primarily to facilitate a free exercise analysis.
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potential for ousting people from access to remedies. Part m will examine the
apparently absolute language of the Ohio civil rights statutes, related federal laws,
and the role of the federal and state courts in interpretation, abstention, and
preemption. Part IV will suggest the most appropriate interpretation of the Ohio
statutes. And, Part V will conclude by recommending a mode of analysis that would
expand the ecclesiastical exemption from civil rights laws to include most, if not all,
teachers in religiously operated and oriented elementary and secondary schools but
limit other staff exemptions to those schools that do not receive public assistance.
I. PROPAGATION: OF A CHILD, OF A FAITH, AND OF THE CONMOVERSY
In January 1979 Linda Hoskinson, a teacher at Dayton Christian Schools
(DCS),5 informed Principal James Rakestraw that she was pregnant. Rakestraw then
took the matter up with DCS Superintendent Claude Schindler, who directed
Rakestraw to notify Hoskinson that she would not be given a contract for the next
academic year "because of our desire to have a mother home with pre-school age
children." 6 Rakestraw responded in late February7 in writing that:
[A]s you will be a new parent (June) your teaching next year would be in contrast to the
School's philosophy. As a school, we see the importance of the mother in the home during
the early years of child growth. This is a factor we consider as we interview prospective
teachers. If there are pre-school age children in the home we recommend the mother stay
there and do not accept her application.8
DCS concedes it "had not adequately explained" its philosophy on this point.
Indeed, in testimony the superintendent acknowledged this and concluded that the
DCS faculty and staff, including Hoskinson, were "not fully aware of the convictions
of the administration and of the School Board relative to this particular Biblical
principle." But, he said, the policy of the school had been consistent "since its
inception," and he acknowledged having applied that policy in the past.9
5. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation that operates elementary and secondary school
facilities in Montgomery County, Ohio.
6. Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1984). The
sexist, by many current standards, tone of some of the scriptures cited by DCS is apparent. See, e.g. I Peter 3:1 (King
James): "Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands; that, if any obey not the word, they also may
without the word be won by the conversation of the wives."; I Timothy 2:9-15 (King James):
In like manner also, that women adorn themselves in modest apparel, with shame facedness and sobriety; not
with braided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array; But (which becometh women professing Godliness) with
good works. Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp
authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve .... She shall be saved in
childbearing, if they continue in faith and charity and holiness with sobriety.
However, the scripture most relevant to the duty of women to be at home with their children seems to be in Titus 2:1,
4-15 (King James): "But speak thou the things which become sound doctrine: .. .That they may teach the young
women to . . . love their husbands, to love their children, To be discreet, chaste, keepers at home ....
7. The District Court says the memorandum was received by Hoskinson "on or about February 20," 578 F. Supp.
1004, 1012, and it has become known as the "February 20, 1979" memo or letter. 766 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1985).
8. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1012.
9. Id. Counsel for the Commission has indicated that while the school had no written policy other than general
reference to scripture, she (counsel) is aware of no instance, before or since this litigation, where the school has permitted
a woman with young children to be a full time teacher, although it may have permitted such a woman on a part time basis.
Interview with Kathlecn McManus, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Attorney General of Ohio, in Columbus (Apr. 16, 1986).
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Based on all of the evidence before it, the district court rejected the Commis-
sion's contention that the duty of a mother to stay at home to raise her children was
the mere "personal philosophy" of the superintendent "simply because the belief
might not have been a clearly articulated tenet at DCS." Furthermore, the court made
a specific finding that Schindler's "initial decision not to renew Mrs. Hoskinson's
teaching contract was founded on religious precepts and therefore falls within the
ambit of the first amendment's protection afforded to the free exercise of religion." 10
The court noted that intrafaith differences are common in many religions, and it found
"deficient" the notion that "only those practices based upon articulated, agreed
upon, and well established religious beliefs of the institution should receive first
amendment protection."" Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs have maintained
that this is institutional doctrine based on scripture. 12
After receiving the February 20 memorandum, Hoskinson and her husband
consulted with an attorney who wrote to the superintendent concerning this
apparently discriminatory practice. The letter advised that
[t]o preclude my client from further employment on the basis of pregnancy and child rearing
constitutes violation of both state and federal discrimination laws ... should you not extend
further employment to her on the basis of pregnancy, we will have no alternative but to
explore all state and federal administrative and court remedies.' 3
On March 14, 1979, the superintendent and the principal met with Hoskinson and
suspended her then and there, as the district court found, "because she had gone to
an attorney."' 4 That, said the school officials, violated the biblical chain of
command, adherence to which was a specific requirement of her contract with the
school. '5
10. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1031.
11. Id.
12. See, for example, Appellecs' Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 3, Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
13. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1012.
14. Id. Despite the lower courts' conclusions on the dual reasons underlying the dismissal of Hoskinson, in
argument before the Supreme Court, the school cast the chain of command principle in a different light:
I think that is a conciliation procedure which was used here, was used then repeatedly in the present
circumstances, and she was not fired because she was pregnant. She was not fired because she went to a lawyer.
In each case the school said, come back and let's talk about this. Let's see if we can't become reconciled. And
it is only at the end of that process, when on the advice of her attorney she refuses to participate in that
proceeding, that she is finally told, as the school told her, we can no longer walk together. In other words, at
that point, she is terminated.
I think that another aspect of her commitment is the fact that she signed a contract in which she pledged her
adherence to all the beliefs of the school, and she was hired on the basis of that commitment. Her religious
representations caused her to get the job. Those are very extensive religious requirements of which she was
aware.
Official Transcript, Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States, Case No. 85-488, at 43 (Mar. 26, 1986).
15. Matthen, 18:15-17 (King James): "Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault
between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with
thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect
to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a
publican." Galatians 6:1 (King James): "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual, restore such
an one in the spirit of meekness; considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted." As the district court noted, Hoskinson
was aware of the Biblical Chain of Command. On the employment application which she filled out was a question "As
a teacher in a Christian School, on what basis would you require obedience of your students?" The reply, in her own
handwriting, was: "Obedience to those in authority over you is clearly stated in the Bible. I believe in God's Chain of
1986]
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The next day Hoskinson met with the DCS Board, at which time her pregnancy
was discussed. On March 26, at a meeting at which she was not present, the Board
decided to discharge her. The following day, March 27, a letter was sent to
Hoskinson, rescinding the memorandum of February 2016 but discharging her due to
"a serious philosophical difference" with particular reference to her violation of
Paragraph 13 of the contract (the Chain of Command principle). 17 On March 28
Hoskinson filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
(OCRC), claiming sex discrimination because of the nonrenewal due to pregnancy
and retaliatory dismissal for having consulted a lawyer. 18
The filing set in motion, in April and May of 1979 a series of traditional
procedures of the OCRC. These included launching a preliminary inquiry, a
suggestion that DCS consider "adjustment of the matter," additional prodding for
adjustment, and notice that a formal investigation would ensue from failure to adjust.
In October the OCRC presented to DCS counsel a fairly standard but lengthy list of
information that OCRC wanted for an investigative conference in November, as well
as a notice that it wished to interview certain school officials. The list sought
complete information from January 1, 1977 to October 29, 1979 on the following:
employment data on Hoskinson; current employee handbooks and rules; written DCS
policies governing discipline, discharge, pregnancy, oral or written performance
evaluations and standards, employees working with preschool children, contract
renewals, grievance procedures, employee resort to the legal system, determinations
of "serious philosophical differences," and inquiries into employees' financial status
and babysitting plans; job descriptions and model contracts; employee pregnancy and
any change of status and reasons therefore; and suspension and discharge records. In
addition, the OCRC asked for current employment application forms; a written
position statement regarding Hoskinson's allegations; minutes of the March 15 and
26, 1979 meetings of the DCS Board of Directors, and the complete personnel files
of Hoskinson and other DCS employees.19
In January 1980 the OCRC told DCS counsel that it was probable that DCS had
engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices and it proposed a conciliation agree-
ment. Inter alia, the Commission found:
Evidence and testimony indicate that but for the fact that Complainant is female and selected
to have a child, she would have been offered a teaching contract for the 1979-1980 school
year. Evidence and testimony also indicate that Complainant's discharge, and the reasons
Command." 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1012. Subsequently, she also personally initialed paragraph 13 of her employment
contract which read: "The Teacher agrees to follow the Biblical pattern of Matthew 18:15-17 and Galatians 6:1 and
always give a good report. All differences are to be resolved by using Biblical principles-always presenting a united
front." 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1013; 766 F.2d 932, 940. The district court noted that Hoskinson had admitted in her own
testimony that she was aware that the chain of command requires one Christian not to take another Christian to law; the
court also found that on an earlier occasion (in 1977) she had failed to adhere to the principle, was warned, and had faced
possible discharge, but was rehired. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1013.
16. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
17. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1013. In addition, article 8, § 4 of the Constitution of Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., states
"the Board of Directors shall have the right to dismiss any employee . . . whose personal life or instruction conflicts
with the basis and purposes of the corporation . Id. at 1011 n.4.




given for it by Respondent, were directly linked to the February 20, 1979 memo which
stated that she would not be offered a contract because "[i]f there are pre-school age children
in the home we recommend the mother stay there and do not accept her application."
Evidence and testimony indicate the Complainant would not have been thus treated had she
been a male, and that, therefore, she has been discriminated against because of her sex.20
DCS did not appear at a conciliation conference and had declined to respond to or
sign the proposed Conciliation Agreement which, in addition to requiring reinstate-
ment with back pay and prohibition against retaliation against Hoskinson, also
required the school to "implement and administer the policies and work rules of the
school equally without regard for employees' . . . sex [or] religion .... "21 After
DCS failed to sign the proposed Conciliation Agreement and Consent Order or to
present a counterproposal, the Commission filed formal charges in April 1980 to
initiate administrative hearings on both the sex discrimination and retaliatory
dismissal issues. DCS answered in May. An August hearing date was postponed, and
DCS filed suit in United Staites District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, at
Dayton, a week before the rescheduled hearing, then set for October 8, 1980.22
The federal complaint, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought declaratory and
injunctive relief from application of the Ohio civil rights statutory procedures 23 to
20. Id. at 1015.
21. Some of the other provisions required that:
E. Respondent will not discharge Complainant without just cause. Respondent will submit to the North
Southwest Regional Office of the Commission, copies of any warnings or reprimands given to Complainant
during the next one (1) year, and will also notify said office if Complainant is discharged for any reason within
the period of one (1) year.
F. Respondent agrees to implement and administer the policies and work rules of the school equally without
regard for the employees' handicap, race, sex, religion, age, color, national origin or ancestry.
G. Respondent shall post in a conspicuous place or places on its premises, the Commission's mandatory notice
which sets forth excerpts of Chapter 4112, Ohio Revised Code, and other relevant information.
H. Respondent shall not seek information regarding race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, handicap
or ancestry on its form of application, unless a bona fide occupational qualification is certified in advance by
the Commission.
I. Respondent shall make clear in its employment contracts that employees may contact the Commission if
they believe they are being discriminated against at any time because of handicap, race, sex, religion, age,
color, national origin or ancestry.
J. Respondent agrees to establish specific guidelines for employee pregnancy and home child care, to notify
all employees in writing of this policy, and to furnish the Commission's North Southwest Regional Office,
within sixty (60) days from the date of ratification of this agreement, proof of compliance with this provision.
K. Not later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this conciliation agreement and consent order, an
authorized officer of the designated Respondent will furnish the North Southwest Regional Office of the
Commission a certified check, made to the order of Complainant, for the full amount of back pay stipulated
to in paragraph I(b) supra. Id. at 1015-16.
22. Id. at 1016.
23. Osso REv. CODe AN-. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985). Inter alia, section 4112.04(B) permits the
Commission to:
(2) Initiate and undertake on its own motion investigations of problems of employment discrimination;
(3) Hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths, take the testimony of any
person under oath, and require the production for examination of any books and papers relating to any matter
under investigation or in question before the commission, and may make rules as to the issuance of subpoenas
by individual commissioners.
(a) In conducting a hearing or investigation, the commission shall have access at all reasonable times to
premises, records, documents, individuals, and other evidence or possible sources of evidence and may
examine, record, and copy such materials and take and record the testimony or statements of such persons as
are reasonably necessary for the furtherance of the investigation. In such investigations, the commission shall
comply with the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution relating to unreasonable searches and
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the employment practices of the Dayton Christian Schools on grounds that the Ohio
statutory scheme contravenes the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. The plaintiffs in the case, in addition to DCS,
include Patterson Park Church, Christian Tabernacle; DCS Officials; two parents who
alleged that the Ohio law "burdens and endangers the ability of parents to choose a
religious education for their children;" and a teacher who charged that the state
statute "burdens and endangers the opportunity of religious teachers and adminis-
trators to carry out their religious vocation in the Christian formation and education
of young people.' 24
The district court on October 6 granted a temporary restraining order preventing
the OCRC from conducting a public hearing. By agreement of the parties, a trial on
the merits was consolidated with a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent
injunction.25 That trial was held on December 8, 1980. On January 6, 1984, the court
denied the permanent injunction and dismissed the case, holding that the exercise of
jurisdiction by the OCRC did not "impermissibly impinge on Plaintiffs' free exercise
rights or result in excessive government entanglement in religion. ' 26
In June 1985 a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
reversed, 27 holding that the employment discrimination and retaliatory dismissal
provisions of the Ohio civil rights statutes constitutionally could not be applied to
employment in a religiously permeated school when the challenged practices serve to
fulfill the religious mission of the school. 28 The State of Ohio appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which has accepted the case for appellate
review. 29
In Dayton Christian Schools everyone concedes the predominantly sectarian-
fundamentalist Christian-aura of the educational setting. This is apparent from the
testimony of the complainant herself, school officials, and the findings of the district
court to that effect:
As no contrary evidence was presented by the Defendant as to the religious purpose and
mission of the school, the Court concludes that the religious purpose and mission of Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc., is for propagation of the Christian beliefs and faith and that this
religious orientation is an integral part of the school's philosophy and operation. The
seizures. The commission or a commissioner may issue subpoenas to compel access to or the production of such
materials, or the appearance of such persons, and may issue interrogatories to a respondent, to the same extent
and subject to the same limitations as would apply if the subpoenas or interrogatories were issued or served in
aid of a civil action in a common pleas court. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Section 4112.05(G) allows the Commission to "cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring such respondent
to cease and desist from such unlawful discriminatory practice and to take such further affirmative or other action as will
effectuate the purposes of sections 4112.01 to 4112.08 of the Revised Code, including, but not limited to, hiring,
reinstatement, or upgrading of employees with, or without, back pay, admission or restoration to union membership,
including a requirement for reports of the manner of compliance."
24. 766 F.2d 932, 935 n.4.
25. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1008.
26. Id. at 1041. The court also held that the Ohio statutes giving the OCRC jurisdiction "are not unconstitutionally
overbroad or void for vagueness." Id. The district court also granted plaintiffs an injunction pending appeal. Dayton
Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 604 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
27. Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 947 passim.
29. 106 S. Ct. 379 (Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-488).
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aforesaid religious purposes are shown by the evidence to permeate the school's goals,
curriculum and administration.30
The pervasive religious atmosphere was evident:
Every aspect of the school's operation is geared toward exposing and educating the students
on how to lead a Christian life by understanding what the members consider to be the
guidance and direction provided by the Bible. As revealed in the testimony at the hearing on
this matter and in the exhibits accepted into evidence, the teachers at DCS are selected
because of their ability to blend their avowed religious beliefs into every lesson and school
activity. Teachers are required to be born again Christians and to carry with them into their
classes the religious fervor and conviction felt necessary to stimulate young minds into
accepting Christ as savior. Because of the emphasis placed on the religious education of the
students, the school demands that teachers conform both in thought and conduct to the tenets
and principles felt essential to leading a Christian life. The belief system espoused by the
members of DCS touches every aspect of their life: work, interpersonal relationships, family
and recreational activities. Deviation in any way from what is felt to be the proper religious
way of life may cast doubt on a teacher's ability to perform his or her critical role and may,
therefore, be grounds for dismissal.31
These conclusions were unchallenged by the OCRC on appeal before the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.32 Also unchallenged was the awareness of all
concerned of the biblical chain of command doctrine 33 and its implications for
employment.34
The underlying complaint-namely, sex discrimination by the nonrenewal of
employment contract based upon the school's view that a mother's place is at home
with her pre-school age children, and whether a state constitutionally may prohibit a
sectarian elementary and secondary school from imposing such a religion-based
standard35 upon an employee that the school and the employee conclude is in the role
of an exemplar-is at the crux of this case. It is further complicated by the retaliatory
dismissal for breaking the religious chain of command.
II. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND: A TIE THAT BLINDS
There has been an aggressive pursuit of the premise that the Supreme Court
should dispose of the Dayton Christian Schools case on grounds that allowing a
religion-based chain of command doctrine to prevail would oust the civil authority
of any capacity to make threshold inquiries. 36 The Commission and those amici in its
support maintain that it is inherent in the authority of the state at least to inquire
whether the first amendment mandates an exemption of religion from "facially
30. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1010.
31. Id. at 1018-19.
32. 766 F.2d 932, 936 n.6.
33. See supra notes 15, 17.
34. See supra note 15 regarding Hoskinson's familiarity with the doctrine.
35. See supra note 6.
36. The brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Women's Legal Defense Fund, amici curiae in support
of the Civil Rights Commission, is devoted almost solely to that topic, as is a small portion of the brief of American Jewish
Congress, amicus curiae, urging affirmance in part and reversal in part. On the other hand, the potential for extensive and
perhaps unconstitutional entanglement is evident from the procedures outlined in Parts I and II. See supra notes 19-23
and accompanying text and infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
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neutral" governmental regulations of general applicability that serve compelling
governmental interests. Closely related to this issue of jurisdiction to inquire is the
importance of the state's interest in protecting an employee from retaliation for
consulting with counsel or for filing a complaint with the appropriate authorities.
DCS has suggested that the chain of command as a valid basis for retaliatory
dismissal should await the determination of the merits of the underlying religious
claim-that one who has agreed to abide by the chain of command and breaks the
agreement may have to run the risk, on a case-by-case basis, in which the courts
would still be the ultimate arbiter. Unfortunately, this approach places upon a
complainant the significant burden of the risk of how a court ultimately will rule, and
runs contrary to the generally accepted rule protecting good faith complainants from
retaliation. 37 One need not go so far as to hypothesize that in a school such as DCS,
where every employee including custodial personnel has sworn (and perhaps
contracted) to the articles of faith, including the chain of command, that if a janitor
reports a faulty fire extinguisher to the fire department 38 he or she might be subject
to dismissal. First, the courts would balance the religious interest with the health and
safety interest of young people. 39 More significantly, the religious interest itself
would be diminished because the janitor may be less likely to be a central exemplar
than is a teacher. Still, the possibility that a religious institution (utilizing a chain of
command doctrine) may be totally immunized from any secular scrutiny whatsoever
creates an agonizing tension between the competing values of the religion clauses of
the first amendment and a legitimate state concern for eradicating discrimination-
and the complete triumph of either value is unacceptable.
A possible approach for dispensing with the chain of command/retaliatory
dismissal on other grounds than whether a claim was filed in good faith is also related
to outcome. Should the Court decide that there was no jurisdiction over religious
elementary and secondary schools or, even more narrowly, over teachers in such
schools, the Court then could permit the retaliatory dismissal issue to abide a decision
on the jurisdiction question. Thus, the tension between the competing constitutional
values could be reduced by allowing a chain of command exemption only to a very
narrow category of institutions or certain personnel within those institutions. In the
absence of statutory guidance, the exemption could further be narrowed or more
clearly defined by a presumption (for or against allowing the exemption) which could
include some external indicia, such as whether the institution accepted direct or
indirect state or federal aid, whether it claimed and was granted exemption from sales
37. In "[e]very circuit that has considered the issue, opposition activity is protected when it is based on a mistaken
good faith belief that Title vn has been violated." Love v. RE/MAX of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir.
1984). For the Ohio antiretaliation statute, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
38. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 62, at 42. Curiously, counsel for the School, in responding
to questions from the Court in oral argument, answered that the chain of command would be applicable to matters of
reporting child abuse, rape, and other crimes. Official Transcript, supra note 14, at 36-38, 42. However, obviously aware
of this error in failing to distinguish health and safety matters, counsel filed a post-argument brief reversing himself in this
area. Post-argument Brief of Dayton Christian Schools, Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 766 F.2d
932 (6th Cir. 1985), appeal granted, 106 S. Ct. 379 (Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-488) 1-7.
39. Including whether fear of dismissal might deter the janitor from reporting if internal administrative efforts did
not immediately succeed in having the fire extinguisher repaired or replaced.
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or property taxes, or whether it was eligible for and accepted tax-deductible
contributions. Other, more subjective indicia, such as centrality-to-the-faith (as in
Wisconsin v. Yoder4') and the religious role of the employee in the institution, are
also possible.41
There is a public policy strongly disfavoring waiver of significant rights.42 There
is also a constitutionally troubling feature of the chain of command argument, which
surfaces in the effects of its successful assertion. Insulating the school from the Ohio
Civil Rights Act's antiretaliation provision apparently could prevent secular author-
ities from reviewing and remedying any kind of wrongdoing, discriminatory or
otherwise. Here, if given full weight, this insulation would appear to preclude the
courts from making any threshold judgment, even upon jurisdiction over the
underlying discrimination claim.
Another approach would be for the courts to put the burden upon the religious
institution to take other actions against Hoskinson that would have less drastic impact
than ousting the civil authority of jurisdiction-namely, as the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit suggested in EEOC v. Pacific Press,43 the imposition of internal
religious sanctions for substantial violations of religious principles. That analysis may
be unworkable in this case because one of the specific biblical sanctions for breach
of chain of command could be a form of excommunication. 44 But if Hoskinson were
to be excommunicated, she no longer would be regarded as of sufficient faith to teach
in the religious school, in just the same way as the violation of the chain of command
itself rendered her religiously unqualified in the eyes of school officials.
More significant are the arguments that in other cases there could be a
proliferation of dubious or even fraudulent claims. But that is not the situation in this
case (as both lower courts found), and thus it would be a less appropriate basis for
decision.
Even if one concedes the reasonableness of not allowing the chain of command
argument to prevail on first amendment grounds over a broader social interest of the
state, 45 that will not dispose of the issue of whether DCS should have been allowed
to refuse to renew Hoskinson's teaching contract or required to reinstate her. A
resolution of the chain of command issue merely may establish whether she was owed
back pay from the point of her precipitous discharge to the end of that school year.
40. 46 U.S. 205 (1972).
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1979). See also infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
42. Judicial disfavor of waiver of significant rights is illustrated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
Court stated that "[tfhis Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights," and "a
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Id. at 475.
43. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing, 676 F.2d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. Matthew 18:17 (King James) says of those who disregard chain of command, "let him be unto thee as an
heathen man and a publican."
45. This would follow a century-old line of cases dealing with such matters as prohibition on polygamy, Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), and criminalizing nonpayment of Social Security taxes although payment of the
taxes conflicted with the Amish faith, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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II. TREATING THE STATUTE AS GOSPEL
Ohio civil rights laws make it an unlawful discriminatory practice for any
employer of four or more persons46 on account of, inter alia, the "religion [or]
sex... of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise
to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, or any matter directly related to employment.'"'47 The
definition of "sex" clearly includes, "but [is] not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out of and occurring during the course of a
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 48 Further, women who are
affected by pregnancy or childbirth "shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work .... 49
The Ohio scheme creates no religion-based or other exception for acts of
employment discrimination based on religion or sex, although it permits inquiries,
advertising, and recordkeeping on religion, gender and other bases where an
employer asserts "a bona fide occupational qualification certified in advance by the
commission .... "o50 On its face, then, while the statute permits certain employment
related-practices if a bona fide occupational qualification is applied for and certified,
the act of discriminating in hiring or retention on the basis of religion or sex in a job
where there was such a bona fide occupational qualification nevertheless would still
appear to be a violation of the plain language of the statute. Both the district courts'
and the court of appeals 52 adhered to this literal reading (much like a fundamentalist
interpretation of the Bible), viewing the language of the statute both in light of the
absence of any Ohio legislative history and in the face of a specific exclusion from
the fair housing portion of the civil rights act for religious institutions that give
housing preference to their coreligionists. 53
In its failure to include any religious exemption or qualification whatsoever, the
Ohio law54 clearly is distinguishable from the comparable provisions of federal law.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities-5
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) states:
46. Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(2) (Page 1980).
47. Omo R .CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985).
48. Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (Page 1980).
49. Id.
50. Oo Ray. CODE Ae. § 4112.02(E) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985). See infra note 80.
51. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1020.
52. 766 F.2d 932, 940-41 n.16.
53. The fair housing section is Owo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985); the religious
exemption to it is contained in section 4112.02(K), but it does not apply to the employment section.
54. The Ohio law, first passed in 1959, antedates the federal civil rights statute, which was enacted in 1964.
55. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
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[I]t shall not be pn unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other
educational insqtution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular
religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the
curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution
of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
The Ohio statute also differs from the laws of most other states5 6 which were adopted
or modified after the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth a system of administrative
inquiries, hearings, and findings, as well as a resort to Ohio's Courts of Common
Pleas for declaratory and injunctive proceedings to enforce, modify, or set aside
Commission orders. 57 However, there is no de novo consideration, for the Commis-
sion's fact-finding is "conclusive if supported by reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the record .... 58 The act also separately makes it a crime to engage
in any unlawful discriminatory practice listed in the substantive sections.59 A related
provision makes unlawful any act of retaliation because a person "has opposed any
unlawful practice defined in this section. . . ,"6o but while a retaliatory practice is
subject to administrative and civil law remedies, it carries no criminal sanction.
The Commission maintains that the district and appeals courts erred in holding
that the Ohio statutory scheme does not give it the authority to create a religious bona
fide occupational qualification. 6' Even so, the Commission also asserts that the
exemplary function of elementary and secondary teachers is not sufficient to bring
them into a purely ecclesiastical role worthy of exemption. 62
In the absence of Ohio judicial construction, the district court might have applied
abstention here. In oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Commission, in
response to questions from the Court, asserted that the Younger 63 issue was raised
before, but not addressed by, the district court. 64 In an unusual post-argument brief in
the Supreme Court, DCS urged that neither Younger nor Pullman65 abstentions were
appropriate because the state never disputed jurisdiction 66 and because the scheme of
56. The court of appeals provides a list in a lengthy note 766 F.2d 932, 941 n.18. A recent example of a broad
exemption being upheld is a case in which a teacher of secular subjects in a sectarian school was dismissed purportedly
because she was not a follower of the school's religion. A state trial court in California ruled that a blanket exemption
from state antidiscrimination laws given to religious employers in California did not violate the establishment clause of
the first amendment nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Bennett v. Department of Fair
Employment and Housing, No. C497 487 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1986) 6-8 (order denying plaintiff's and granting
defendant's motion for sumnary judgment).
57. Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. § 4112.06(A)-.06(B) (Page 1980).
58. Owo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4112.06(E) (Page 1980).
59. Under this section any such discriminatory practice is a misdemeanor of the third degree. Otno Ray. Cone ANN.
§ 4112.99 (Page 1980).
60. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4112.02(1) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985).
61. Jurisdictional Statement at 14, n.7.
62. Id. at 13 (citing EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981)).
63. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
64. Official Transcript, supra note 14, at 7-8.
65. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
66. Post-argument Brief of Dayton Christian Schools, supra note 38 at 7.
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the act is not subject to any state interpretation that would permit the Commission to
find a bona fide occupational qualification. 67 The prospect of abstention, however,
may be very attractive to the Supreme Court, which could remand with an opinion
suggestive of guidelines for interpretation. 68 Furthermore, DCS's argument that the
administrative procedures are entangling and that the Ohio processes for appeal of the
Commission's administrative proceedings are very limited69 are not all that persua-
sive; Dayton Christian Schools could have filed its section 1983 action in state
court.70 However, to invoke abstention now when it was not very vigorously
contended below could complicate and drag out the already lengthy proceedings, 71
unless very significant guidance is given by the Supreme Court.
As interpreted by both the district court, which upheld the Commission's right
to proceed, and the Court of Appeals, which denied that prerogative, the Ohio
statutory scheme, unless tortuted, could not yield a religious exemption. Both courts
declined to stretch it on the rack.
Another possible interpretation is to hold the federal religious exemption
pre-empts inconsistent Ohio law and therefore is to be read into the Ohio statute.
Clearly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contemplates parallel federal
and state systems for eradicating employment discrimination. Indeed, the federal
statute provides for prior resort to available state administrative remedies. However,
state laws generally are not pre-empted except where they contravene the purpose of
Title VII or "purport to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.' '72 Still, it might not require too
much stretching, either through pre-emption by, or through interpretation of the Ohio
statutes in pari materia with, the religious exemptions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 and
§ 2000-2(e)(2)73 to make their inclusion "unlawful employment practices." Indeed,
in a related area, the Supreme Court has been very creative in concluding that "the
absence of an affirmative intention of Congress fortifies" its conclusion that
Congress would not want the NLRB interfering with church-operated schools. 74
Thus, a court might adopt an analogous approach and conclude that the federal
religious exemption pre-empts or modifies a state prohibition which might be law-
ful under Title VII, and apply the statutory construction scheme of Catholic Bishop.
A court very concerned with free exercise of religion could determine the
67. Id. at 7-11.
68. Colloquy between the Court and counsel for Dayton Christian Schools follow this line of thought. Official
Transcript, supra note 14, at 26-31.
69. Post-argument Brief of Dayton Christian Schools, supra note 38, at 7-11.
70. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
71. See C. Waorrr, HANDBOOK ON -am LAw OF FEnDat. Cotrss §§ 52-52A (3d ed. 1976).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982).
73. The Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, has resorted to federal court interpretation of Title VII definitions to
bridge perceived gaps in Ohio civil rights laws. In Plumbers and Steamfitters Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 66
Ohio St. 2d 192, 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981), the Ohio court noted, "[W]e have determined that federal case law interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases
involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112." Id. at 196, 421 N.E.2d, at 131.
74. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The Catholic Bishop approach to statutory construction
focused upon a search for a "clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress that teachers in church-operated
schools . . . be covered under the Act." Id. at 504. Noting the absence of such an expression, the Court declined to
construe the Act in a manner which would require resolution of difficult constitutional questions. Id. at 504-07.
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presence of an affirmative exception in Title VII constitutes federal pre-emption and
preclusion of state legislation that does not exempt religious institutions from the
operation of state civil rights statutes. 75
Dayton Christian Schools and various amici76 maintain that taken on its face, the
absolute terms of the Ohio statute could lead to prohibiting the Catholic Church from
employing only celibate males as priests, barring synagogues from hiring only males
who eschew celibacy as rabbis, or striking down all gender-based religious standards.
Moreover, the language of the Ohio statute even seems to preclude a religious test for
such religious positions. Thus, without a constitutionally-imposed or some other
limitation, the Catholic Church could not require a priest to be Catholic so long as the
person could conduct a mass and perform all other duties. Similarly, the synagogue
could not insist that its rabbi be Jewish, if he or she could otherwise perform the
duties, and so on. Common sense suggests that the Ohio General Assembly did not
intend those results. Even if it did, the first amendment would not permit that level
of interference in religiously oriented employment.
77
The district court noted the problems with the literal reading of the Ohio law.
While observing that the ability of religious schools to "actively seek out teachers
who are adherents to their religious beliefs" has "almost never been seriously
questioned," 78 that court expressed its doubt whether the Commission, even by
certifying a bona fide occupational qualification, could relieve the school "from the
apparent unconditional prohibition contained in subsection (A) against discriminating
on the basis of religion in the hiring and firing of employees." 79 That relief may,
however, be a reasonable approach for the United States Supreme Court to adopt.
While the Ohio antidiscrimination statutes do not provide for any religious
exemption in religious employment, the provision for employers to have a bona fide
occupational qualification certified in advance supports a construction-not relied
upon by the district court or the court of appeals-of the statute to permit religious
exemptions. The Ohio General Assembly, in providing for the possibility of
administrative exemptions from a series of acts regarding recruiting, advertising, and
recordkeeping, 80 could not have intended that such acts incidental to employment be
75. However, four sitting members of the Court, without expressing a conclusion on the first amendment claims
in Catholic Bishop, found the majority's judicial construction "plainly wrong" and "seemingly invented by the Court for
the purpose of deciding this case." 440 U.S. 490, 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. These amici include, inter alia. the American Jewish Congress, the Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, and
the United States Catholic Conference.
77. In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the Supreme Court came close to adopting a similar view
regarding NLRB jurisdiction over sectarian school employment, see id. at 498-99, but decided the case instead on what
may be at best a very creative construction of a restrained intent of Congress based on a very limited record of that
purported intent. The Court noted that a statute "ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available." See id. at 500.
78. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1020.
79. Id. at 1020 n.6.
80. Oiuo Rsv. Cos AN-;. § 4112.02(E) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985) makes it unlawful:
(E) Except where based on a bona fide occupational qualification certified in advance by the commission, for
any employer, employment agency, or labor organization, prior to employment or admission to membership,
to:
(I) Elicit or attempt to elicit any information conceming the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap,
age, or ancestry of any applicant for employment or membership;
1986]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
allowed to occur without there being bona fide occupational qualifications upon
which employers could in fact discriminate despite the apparently absolute language
of Ohio Revised Code section 4112.02(A). Anything other than such an interpretation
makes the reference to bona fide occupational qualification meaningless, and section
4112.02(A) should be read in pari materia with section 4112.02(E). Thus, the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission would seem to have authority to establish bona fide
religious occupational qualifications-although the quality of statutory guidance in
determining the standards for such a "certification" is clearly in doubt.
Here, however, the institution did not seek to be certified in advance. Moreover,
the Commission apparently does not well regard the school's claim of Hoskinson's
duty to be at home (even if clearly asserted in advance to her in religious language
emanating from the highest source within the sponsoring religious institutions, and
even if the school applied for advance certification), although the district court
believed that the OCRC would certify adherence to the faith ("co-religion") as a
religious bona fide occupational qualification. 81
Indeed, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Commission asserted
that, having due regard for the Constitution, it would certify co-religion as a general
ecclesiastical bona fide occupational qualification. 82 However, the Commission
was not willing to concede that it would certify as a bona fide occupational
qualification the specific qualification of being a "good" Christian woman willing to
stay home and raise young children. To date, it does not appear that any church or
school has ever applied for an exemption based on co-religion as a bona fide
occupational qualification, and certainly not for such a specific one.83
IV. SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION
The Ohio Supreme Court has not been heard on the issue of religious exemptions
from the civil rights statutes, 84 but it has not been silent on relieving religious schools
(2) Make or keep a record of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry of any
applicant for employment or membership;
(3) Use any form of application for employment, or personnel or membership blank seeking to elicit information
regarding race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry; but an employer holding a
contract containing a nondiscrimination clause with the government of the United States, or any department or
agency thereof, may require an employee or applicant for employment to furnish documentary proof of United
States citizenship and may retain such proof in the employer's personnel records and may use photographic or
fingerprint identification for security purposes;
(4) Print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment or
membership indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based upon race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry;
(5) Announce or follow a policy of denying, or limiting, through a quota system or otherwise, employment or
membership opportunities of any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age,
or ancestry of such group;
(6) Utilize in the recruitment or hiring of persons any employment agency, placement service, training school
or center, labor organization, or any other employee-referring source known to discriminate against persons
because of their race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry.
81. 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1020. Query: Is a co-religionist who breaks the faith still a co-religionist?
82. Official transcript, supra note 14, at 12.
83. Interview with Kathleen MeManus, supra note 9.
84. Nor have other Ohio courts addressed the issue.
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from another generally applied standard. In State v. Whisner85 the Ohio Supreme
Court dealt with the prosecution of twelve parents for promoting truancy by sending
their children to a fundamentalist Christian school in violation of a statute86 requiring
attendance at schools that conform to minimum state standards. In reversing the
convictions and discharging the defendants on grounds that the statute too broadly
imposed upon the free exercise clause, the court used language which could have
application to DCS:
In our view, these standards are so pervasive and all-encompassing that total compliance
with each and every standard by a non-public school would effectively eradicate the
distinction between public and non-public education, and thereby deprive these appellants of
their traditional interest as parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children.87
It would appear that, if confronted by the question whether a religious standard might
be applied to the hiring of a teacher in a religious school, the Ohio Supreme Court, 88
at least in the last decade, would have read in such an exemption. 89 Indeed, the court,
citing the Pierce through Yoder line of cases, 9° held that "the right of a parent to
guide the education, including the religious education, of his or her children is indeed
a 'fundamental right' guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."91
On the question of whether the state interests were of sufficient magnitude to
override free exercise claims, the Ohio court noted that "even if the state can
establish the requisite degree of interest, it must yet demonstrate that such interests
cannot otherwise be served in order to overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion." 92 Even more recently, the Ohio Supreme Court has unani-
mously reaffirmed its role of special protection of free exercise interests, holding that
state-imposed minimum standards may go "no further than necessary to assure the
state's legitimate interests in education of children in private elementary schools,"
noting that "the balance is weighted, ab initio, in favor of a First Amendment claim
to religious freedom.'' 93
The quest to identify other means of protecting the interests of the state could
85. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
86. Owo REv. CODE AN. § 3321.03 (Page 1980).
87. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 211-12, 351 N.E.2d 750, 768.
88. Query whether counsel for Dayton Christian Schools (who also argued for Whisner in the Ohio Supreme Court)
should have sought relief in the Ohio courts!
89. In addition to the free exercise clause of the first amendment, the court relied upon article I, § 7 of the Ohio
Constitution:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any
form of worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall
any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted. . . .Religion, morality, and knowledge, however,
being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable laws, to protect
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to encourage
schools and the means of instruction.
47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 198 n.3, 351 N.E.2d 750, 761 n.3, quoting Olno Co.Sr. art. I, § 7.
90. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
91. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 214, 351 N.E.2d 750, 769.
92. Id. at 217, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
93. State ex rel Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341, 354-55, 415 N.E.2d 279, 288 (1980).
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lead to a decision permitting the institution to discriminate while denying it certain
forms of public support, direct or indirect. The record indicates that DCS declines to
receive some of the forms of aid that are available in Ohio in the wake of Wolman v.
Walter,94 but that students are transported at public expense to and from the school
daily, 95 pursuant to section 3327.01 of the Ohio Revised Code. Interestingly, the
transportation costs are provided to parents with students enrolled in any "school for
which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards," pursuant to
section 3301.07(D), one of the statutes at issue in the Whisner case. Thus, it is clearly
possible for the state to apply a less drastic sanction, by adopting a rule denying an
affirmative benefit such as busing or parental reimbursement for transportation
expenses, or by restricting the availability of tax exemptions by precluding their use
to otherwise qualifying institutions which practice forms of discrimination con-
demned by the state. It is not clear from the record if DCS is eligible for Ohio's
intangible property tax exemption,96 exemption from certain real property taxes,97 or
charitable real and tangible personal property tax exemption. 98 Whether federal
income tax deductibility could be denied by the Internal Revenue Service for
charitable contributions to DCS would have to abide a determination whether the
discrimination involved was contrary to a national policy abolisihing sex discrimi-
nation under such circumstances, and whether, for example, Title VII would be
applicable to DCS.
Using this approach, the state would neither compel DCS to violate its religious
precepts by an order to retain Hoskinson on the faculty nor subject it to a criminal
sanction for dismissing her, but the public policy of the state could be at least partially
vindicated by denying public assistance to the institution. As Chief Justice Burger
observed in a recent establishment clause case, the constitution "mandates accom-
modation, not merely tolerance, of all religions and forbids hostility toward any." 99
OCRC v. Dayton Christian Schools may be a proper case for accommodation and,
given Bob Jones University v. United States,100 the denial of tax exemption or other
affirmative support is not likely to be construed as forbidden hostility. Indeed, in Bob
Jones, in upholding an Internal Revenue Service denial of tax-deductibility status to
that institution on grounds of racial discrimination, the Court noted that "[o]n
occasion this Court has found certain governmental interests so compelling as to
allow even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct."'' Furthermore, "the
Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimina-
94. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Such aid includes textbooks, standardized tests and scoring, medical services, and
diagnostic speech, hearing, and psychological services. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page 1980).
95. 766 F.2d 932, 955.
96. Owo REv. CoDE AeN. § 5709.04 (Page 1980). This section provides exemption of intangible property belonging
to "corporations, trusts, associations, funds, foundations, or community chests, organized and operated exclusively for
religious . . . purposes."
97. Oino REv. Coos ANN. § 5709.07 (Page 1980).
98. Omo REv. CosE ANN. § 5709.12 (Page 1980).
99. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
100. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
101. Id. at 603.
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tion in education .... ,1102 However, the Court also pointed out that" [d]enial of tax
benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious
schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets."' 10 3
V. A MODE OF ANALYSIS
So, it comes back to whether a religiously operated elementary and secondary
school should be permitted to select its faculty on religious, albeit sexist, grounds.
This in turn ultimately comes down to a question of which social values to accent,
which principles to accept and which to reject.
For more than sixty years it has been the law of the land that the free exercise
clause of the first amendment protects the traditional parental control of the religious
education of their children, to the extent that the state cannot compel their attendance
at public schools vis-a-vis church-operated schools. 04 Although the clash between
state-imposed values in education and free exercise of religion claims is difficult to
resolve, the Supreme Court has held that "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in
its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." 1a 5
One of the key factors for deciding whether special treatment shall be accorded
to religious groups depends upon the nature of the institutions involved. This issue
should be resolved, for even if this case is decided in favor of the appellant on some
narrow ground, the issue likely will recur. In a future case if not this one, the
Supreme Court eventually must determine the existence and scope of an elementary
and secondary religious school's authority to make decisions based upon the religious
and moral fitness of its faculty.
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission and others have suggested that significant
reliance ought to be given to a Fifth Circuit holding excluding faculty who teach
secular subjects in a religiously controlled and operated college from the Title VII
religious exemption. 106 That court held:
The College is not a church. The College's faculty and staff do not function as ministers.
The faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its congregation. They
neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of
religious doctrine. That faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing
Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment matters of
church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern.' o7
Indeed, in Bob Jones University v. United States108 there is a note in which the
Supreme Court does make a distinction between churches and schools:
We deal here only with religious schools-not churches or other purely religious institutions;
102. Id. at 604.
103. Id. at 603-04.
104. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1925).
105. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
106. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
107. 626 F.2d 477, 485.
108. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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here, the governmental interest is in denying public support to racial discrimination in
education. As noted earlier, racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive influence
on the entire educational process," outweighing any public benefit that they might otherwise
provide .... '09
However, the Supreme Court has regularly distinguished the religious nature of
elementary and secondary schools on the one hand from that of colleges and
universities on the other. For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman the Court struck down
as unconstitutional certain forms of public aid to religious elementary and secondary
schools, noting that "parochial schools involve substantial religious activity and
purpose." 1 10 However, in Tilton v. Richardson, decided the same day, the Court
upheld different forms of aid to colleges, finding "no basis" for the proposition that
religion so permeates the secular education provided by church-related colleges and
universities that their religious and secular educational functions are in fact
inseparable."' Likewise, the absence of pervasive sectarianism at colleges was the
crux of further decisions upholding revenue bonds for construction" 2 and
noncategorical grants by states. 13
That is not the case, though, in elementary and secondary schools, as the courts
below found in this case and as the Supreme Court has noted in its dealings in the last
few years with teaching functions in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.
For instance, in distinguishing between state funding of diagnostic staff services
(permitted) and state funding of teaching functions (not permitted) the Court drew the
line between the former and latter because of the "opportunity for transmission of
sectarian views as attends the relationship between teacher and student."114 In Meek
v. Pittenger,1 5 the Court rejected state support for remedial teaching because of the
possibility "that religious instruction" will become intertwined with secular instruc-
tion and because, "whether the subject is 'remedial reading,' 'advanced reading,' or
simply 'reading,' a teacher remains a teacher.' 1 6 These primarily establishment
clause cases join with free exercise cases involving parental rights to control primary
and secondary education" 7 and the delicate role of teachers in such schools" 8 to
indicate the Court's special regard and unwillingness to allow broad governmental
intrusion into the arena.
Recent decades have witnessed a strong national commitment to eradicate dis-
109. Id. at 604 n.29 (emphasis in original), quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
110. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
111. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681 (1971).
112. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
113. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
114. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977). Walter is not related to the author!
115. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
116. Id. at 370.
117. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
118. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Although the free exercise clause was not the formal basis
for striking down NLRB jurisdiction over parochial school teachers, id. at 507, it was the pressure of that clause that




crimination based on race, sex,' 19 and some other grounds. Nonetheless, it is possible
to reconcile this commitment with governmental tolerance of some degree of those
forms of discrimination in certain circumstances where that discrimination is sincerely
believed' 20 to be religiously required. Indeed, such tolerance must be permitted to exist
in religious institutions if the free exercise clause of the first amendment is to have
any meaning. Still, the issue remains: how much discrimination must be permitted,
and on what basis should it be permitted? Several possibilities exist.
The most simple solution might be to exempt all employees of all religious
institutions from the statutory requirements. This solution, however, would be far
broader than necessary in that it would fail to protect employees of institutions that
do not have extensive religion-based employment requirements.
Another possible approach would be to exempt religious institutions in a degree
that is inverse to the amount of direct and indirect forms of public aid which flow to
them. Since most institutions of their contributors receive some form of tax benefits
at the very least,' 2' the number of institutions exempted would be small. While this
resolution might warm the hearts of those (including the author) dissatisfied with
public aid to and tax benefits for these religious institutions, it presents a major
problem. Congress and most states already either exempt some categories of religious
employment from antidiscrimination statutes or permit bona fide occupational
qualifications. This solution might upset the delicate balance, carefully crafted and
anchored on well-established public policy in most jurisdictions, that permits
institutions to receive tax exemptions while simultaneously retaining certain religion-
based exemptions from employment discrimination prohibitions. In spite of this
problem, however, a quantum-of-aid test might be a useful ancillary consideration in
looking at these cases.
A third approach might be to exempt certain roles within certain religious
institutions, namely those with an essentially religious mission. Although defining
these roles could be difficult, one possibility is to use a categorical approach such as
the exemption of elementary and secondary school staff which the Supreme Court
utilized in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop.122 In the Dayton Christian Schools case, the
Supreme Court might categorically exempt all aspects of this religious school, relying
on dicta in previous cases relating to the pervasive religious atmosphere and the
sectarian function and role of teachers in these schools.
The preferable solution would blend the latter two approaches, quantum-of-aid
and role exemption. The scope and application of bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions applied to teachers, custodial personnel, and others would depend both upon the
role played by the employee and upon the extent to which an institution chooses to
make itself into a sectarian enclave by declining to accept government aid or benefits.
For example, as noted earlier, Ohio pays for transportation of students to schools
119. The nation's failure to adopt the Equal Rights Amendment might suggest some softness in commitment
regarding sex! The national commitment to free exercise of religion seems to be strong, and it is clearly older.
120. The "question of sincerity . . . is, of course, a question of fact. ... United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 185 (1965).
121. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
122. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
19861
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
which meet certain minimum state standards. Because this aid is not tied to the civil
rights statutes, it is not denied to those schools that engage in religious or gender
discrimination in any role.
If an exemption is created for certain categories of religious institutions (such as
churches and religious elementary and secondary schools), then the threshold
question for the Commission is whether the institution falls into one of those
categories. If the answer is affirmative, it must then be determined if the scope of the
exemption could be narrowed further by a religious role limitation. Both inquiries
would involve some entanglement, however minimal. However, if an institution is
given the option of helping to define itself for these purposes as an enclave of faith
by eschewing certain benefits, that intrusion could be minuscule, avoiding more
excessive forms of entanglement. 123
In order to avoid governmental intrusion into the religious domain, it is well
established that religious discrimination in ecclesiastical positions is permissible
even when that discrimination is related to racial associations and is gender based. 124
Similarly, but not as well established, courts are disinclined to allow some forms of
governmental regulation of employment in positions which may not be ecclesiastical
but are nonetheless related to the mission of a church or church-related institution.125
Where the issue is one of permitting discrimination in favor of co-religionists in
teaching and other jobs in schools, the extent of religious permeation of the
institution and the age of the subjects of instruction (for example, elementary and
secondary school children as opposed to college students) become relevant
considerations. Both factors-quantum-of-aid and role exemption-must be
contemplated in attempting to reconcile the competing societal and constitutional
values involved in this case. On one hand, the first amendment both prohibits
governmental interference with religion and mandates the separation of church and
state. On the other hand is the current national commitment to eradicate
discrimination, which easily could be impaired by government decisions that not
only may imply official approval of discrimination but may foster it for yet another
generation by permitting it to flourish in the presence of the young. A judicial or
123. Assuming that the free exercise clause mandates bona fide occupational qualifications or categories of
exemptions, the court then must provide a mechanism for determining the scope of the role to be played by the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission. In the DCS case, the school challenged the Commission's jurisdiction in court late in the process;
indeed, more than a year and a half after Hoskinson was told her contract would not be renewed. Perhaps, given the
potential for intrusion into the substantial first amendment rights that are at stake, in the face of a claim of constitutional
exemption by a religious school, the Commission should be required, if it wishes to proceed, to obtain a "'judicial
determination of the threshold Frst Amendment Issues." This type of approach has been suggested by University of
Dayton Law Professor Richard Saphire. R. Saphire, Memorandum on the Dayton Christian Schools Case (unpublished
manuscript, Dec. 1985). It would shift the burden to the Commission rather than requiring the school to file. See supra
notes 50, 80-83 and accompanying text. This jurisdictional approach would at least minimize the burden on the institution
claiming exemption, while acknowledging the possibility of inquiry by the Commission into purported acts of unlawful
discrimination.
124. Raybum v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986). And, citing Rayburn and Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently has held that the courts lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over a case in which a minister challenged his enforced retirement under church rules. Hutchison v. Thomas,
No. 85-3051 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1986).
125. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 passim (1979).
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legislative application of the proposed mode of analysis, t 2 6 while not resolving the
conflict of values at play, at least would serve to narrow the instances of conflict and
to give religious institutions some voice in deciding just how much a part of the
secular world they are. Likewise, this mode of analysis will not cause claims of
religiously motivated retaliatory dismissals to vanish, but it would reduce the
potential for such conflict between the competing values of freedom of religion and
nondiscrimination.
Even if the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the court of appeals, there
remain significant unresolved policy judgments which might be addressed legisla-
tively. If the Court does anything other than affirm, these matters will be dealt with
in further administrative or judicial proceedings, or both.' 27 Even so, the egalitarian
126. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In the Dayton Christian Schools case
the lower courts found there to be little evidence of public support in the record, but the record was silent on tax exemption
and deductibility of contributions benefits.
127. While this Article was at the printer, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by a nine-to-nothing margin, with two opinions. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n
v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986), reversing and remanding 766 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1985). A
five-member majority of the Court (per Justice Rehnquist) found attractive the notion that "the District Court should have
abstained from adjudicating this case under Younger. ... Id. at 2722. See supra text accompanying note 68. The
Court said that in the wake of its admonition in Younger to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings,
it had "since recognized that our concern for comity and federalism is equally applicable to certain other pending state
proceedings . . . [including] state administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated so long as
in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional
claim." 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2723. It cited "the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination [as] a sufficiently important state
interest to bring the present case within the ambit" of this concept. Id. As observed supra in the text accompanying note
69, the Court deemed dubious the school's contention that a constitutional challenge could not be made in the
Commission's administrative proceedings: "[E]ven if Ohio law is such that the Commission may not consider the
constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it would seem an unusual doctrine . . . to say that the
Commission could not construe its own statutory mandate in light of federal constitutional principles," 106 S. Ct. 2718,
2724, inviting comparison with the Court's mode of construction in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See
supra note 74 and accompanying text. The majority added that even if the Commission could not consider the
constitutionality of the statute, "it is sufficient . . . that constitutional claims may be raised in state court judicial review
of the administrative proceeding." 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724. See supra note 88 and text accompanying note 70. In a separate
concurrence in the result, four Justices (per Justice Stevens) agreed with the District Court that the potential for coercion
by the Commission at the investigatory and hearing stage was speculative, "premature," and "not ripe for review." 106
S. Ct. 2718, 2726. However, the concurrence disagreed with the majority's expansion of the Younger abstention doctrine
to limit review of even an unconstitutional and coercive order of an administrative agency to the state courts without access
to federal judicial relief of federally guaranteed rights. Id. n.5.
The Court did not address directly the merits of most of the constitutional claims, but explicit or implicit in its holding
are certain conclusions. First, all nine Justices agree that "the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely
investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed
religion-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge." Id. at 2724 and quoted with approval in the concurrence
at 2725-26. See supra text accompanying note 36. Second, all nine Justices agree that while "religious schools cannot
claim to be wholly free from some state regulation," the Commission can and should consider whether any proposed
sanction would violate the religion clauses of the first amendment. 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724, 2726. See supra text following
note 39. Last, there is passing, and impliedly approving, reference to apparent Commission recognition of some degree
of co-religion as a valid basis for employment limitation in sectarian schools. 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724, 2726. See supra
text accompanying notes 78, 81-83, 118.
The net result of the Supreme Court's disposition of the case is that the resolution of the free exercise versus equal
protection controversy-including any interpretation of the Ohio statute and any application of constitutional principles
thereto-is now initially within the province of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, perhaps eventually in the state courts,
and maybe ultimately in the distant future back in the Supreme Court of the United States. The author believes that last
prospect is unlikely for reasons set forth in the first two paragraphs of Part IV. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying
text. While the school's absolutist position on the chain-of-command claim is not likely to succeed (unless the Ohio courts
conclude that the statute does not confer jurisdiction over sectarian school teachers), the long-range prospects are better
if the school presses its underlying desire to be able to hire or dismiss based upon the standard of a "good Christian woman"
as it finds that to be scripturally defined.
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values at stake are incapable of complete accommodation with the free exercise
claims. Any purported resolution will be uneasy-and no amount of verbal massage
will relieve the constitutional tension.
